iberalism relies on “victimization politics” as a source of votes and an explanation of why its candidates lose elections. In keeping with that policy, liberal apologists and the major media (redundant, I know) have been warning of a “Bradley Effect” that could cost their guy, community organizer B.H. Obama, the election.

“The Bradley Effect” is named after former Democratic Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley and his election loss to Republican George Deukmejian in the 1982 California gubernatorial race. “The Bradley Effect” theory is that white voters are irredeemably prejudiced against black candidates. Said white bigots however are afraid to admit such to survey takers on the phone, and so lie about their voting intentions. This produces survey results for black candidates that are higher than the actual results on election day.

An interesting theory, and one that fits the victimization explanation for liberals’ electoral setbacks. However, like most of liberalism’s political theories, it is completely wrong. I know, because I was there.

Back Before Barack
In 1982, I was executive director of Gun Owners of California, which at the time was one of the four or five largest non-party-controlled political action committees in the state.

The gun-phobic liberals decided it would be a good time to disarm law abiding Californians, thereby making it impossible for them to defend themselves against the criminals that liberal policies helped avoid prison. Liberalism is nothing if not the perfect circular argument.

The left qualified an initiative for the 1982 fall ballot that would have essentially banned all handguns. It became Proposition 15 for November, on the same ballot that featured the Bradley-Deukmejian face-off. The National Rifle Association and Gun Owners of California assembled a broad coalition of gun, hunting and outdoor sport groups to oppose Proposition 15. I was the chairman of the official “No on 15” committee.

After being far ahead in surveys in the spring and early summer, Proposition 15 failed in November by about 65 percent to 35 percent. Deukmejian opposed Proposition 15 while Bradley supported it. Surveys taken immediately before the election showed a small to middling Bradley lead over Deukmejian. Actual results on election day gave Deukmejian a victory of about 100,000 votes.

Unable to admit faults in its candidate or his policies, liberalism decided that Bradley lost because racist voters lied to pollsters about their voting intentions. That is not only a gratuitous insult to Californians, it is demonstrably wrong. Bradley lost because he was on the wrong side of a hot ballot proposition and because the Deukmejian campaign outworked and outsmarted Bradley’s on absentee ballots.

The Proposition 15 Effect
Proposition 15 was enormously unpopular with Reagan Democrats and rural voters of all stripes. Bradley’s support of Proposition 15 exposed him to these voters as the doctrinaire liberal he was. Additionally, the “No on 15” campaign included Bradley-Deukmejian comparisons in as much of its anti-15 advertising as possible and outspent “Yes on 15” by about five-to-one in the fall campaign.

Because of Proposition 15, turnout in rural areas was unprecedented, reaching 85 percent to 90 percent in some Central Valley and Sierra foothill counties. Deukmejian’s campaign was savvy enough to ride that tide. For example, in Modoc County, a small county in the northeast corner of the state, “No on 15” got 88 percent and supported Deukmejian in the low 70s. This trend was repeated basically with few exceptions in rural counties throughout the state.

The Absentee Ballot Effect
Proposition 15 (as well as a superbly run Deukmejian campaign, of course) explains why Bradley did poorly in rural areas and among conservative-to-moderate Democrats. But what about the discrepancies in final polling numbers and Election Day results? Actually, the final pre-election surveys weren’t all that far off the mark. They showed a measurable but smallish Bradley lead—which materialized at the polls on Election Day.

Bradley won the vote cast at the ballot boxes, but because of an aggressive absentee ballot effort by the Deukmejian campaign that far outpaced Bradley’s; consequently, Deukmejian won a large majority of the absentee ballots. His absentee margin was enough to give him an overall 100,000 vote victory. The pollsters totally missed this factor as did the exit polls. Their polls were wrong not because racist voters lied to them, but because they failed to factor in absentee ballots.

There is indeed a “Bradley Effect,” however. It is that liberal candidates who admit their liberalism lose. That is the real “Bradley Effect.” That is why Tom Bradley lost. That is also why Barry H. Obama has gone to such great pains to disguise his ultra-liberal past. If he loses, it will be because voters finally unmask him and see the true leftist the Democrats have nominated. Here’s hoping this Bradley effect strikes again.